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1 Introduction
A budget-balanced sharing contract induces ineﬃcient eﬀort provision in risk-
neutral teams even if the team output is deterministic.1 “Anti-Sharing” is an
attempt to solve this sharing problem. It requires the team members to promise
a ﬁxed payment to an Anti-Sharer. They choose their eﬀort and produce the
team output which is collected by the Anti-Sharer. He then pays out the value
of the actual output (net of the initially promised ﬁxed payments) to each of the
team members. Under this contract, the team members reap the full marginal
product of their eﬀort and, therefore, may have an incentive to spend higher
eﬀort than under a sharing contract.
When a team member becomes “internal” Anti-Sharer, this leads to a theory
of the ﬁrm in the spirit of Alchian/Demsetz (1972). In their paper, one team
member takes over a special role to solve the sharing problem: he perfectly mon-
itors the other members and becomes residual claimant. Anti-Sharing does not
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in equilibrium the internal Anti-Sharer is unproductive. Thus, internal Anti-
Sharing is - in general - unable to implement the ﬁrst-best solution. However,
the team may perform better than under a sharing contract.
If an outside player becomes “external” Anti-Sharer, and if he is working
on a non-proﬁt basis, even ﬁrst-best eﬀorts may be implemented. This is in
line with the result of Cooter/Porat (2002), where an external “Anti-Insurer”
induces the parties of a dangerous activity to spend eﬃcient care. The model
presented in this paper is also applicable to problems with stochastic output,
and it mainly addresses internal Anti-Sharing.
Anti-Sharing is diﬀerent from the outside enforcer of a non-balanced sharing
rule mentioned in Holmstrom (1982, 327), as the payments to the Anti-Sharer
are not contingent on whether the actual output reaches the eﬃcient level.
External Anti-Sharing is closely related to “bonding” mentioned by Holmstrom
(1982, 328) in a footnote. Our model also diﬀers from Varian (1994), where
each agent pays the other agents for their eﬀorts and demands a compensation
for his own.
2 The model
2.1 Notation and assumptions
Consider n risk-neutral agents who spend eﬀort ei ≥ 0,i = 1..n to produce
an output Y (e1..en). Individual eﬀorts are assumed to be unobservable.3 We
denote the eﬀort cost of agent i as ci(ei) and assume dci/dei > 0 > d2ci/de2
i
as well as c(0) = 0. Players’ utility functions are separable in wealth and
eﬀort cost. E = (e1..en) is the eﬀort vector of all n players. E(−i) denotes
the eﬀort vector of all n players except player i: E(−i) = (e1..ei−1,ei+1..en).
Consequently, E(−i,−j) is the eﬀort vector without the contributions of players
i and j. For convenience, we write E = (E(−i),ei) = (E(−i,−j),ei,ej). The
production function Y (E) is twice diﬀerentiable, continuous, with positive but
diminishing marginal returns, and with positive cross-partials.
2.2 Ineﬃciency of the Sharing Contract
The socially optimal eﬀort E∗ maximizes Y (E)−
Pn








∀ i = 1..n (1)
As Holmstrom (1982) has demonstrated, a budget-balanced sharing contract
does not induce the players to choose e∗
i. Let si denote the share player i receives
2Moreover, the concept of hierarchy embodied in Anti-Sharing is not based on formal
authority.
3It is impossible to infer individual eﬀorts from observed output if n > 2, or if the output
is stochastic.
4Due to the assumptions we have made concerning the second derivatives, we the second-
order conditions for a maximum are satisﬁed (and subsequently neglected).
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P
si = 1. Under
such a contract, at least one player receives a share smaller than one. Therefore,
at least for some players the incentives are insuﬃcient even if all other players
choose eﬃciently.
The individual payoﬀ in equilibrium amounts to π0
i = siY 0 − ci(e0
i), where
e0
i denotes the equilibrium eﬀort. With positive cross-partials, this is smaller
than the individual payoﬀ for all agents if they choose eﬃciently, i.e., π∗
i =
siY ∗ − ci(e∗
i). Even an agent who is entitled to a share si = 1 would receive
less than Y ∗, since ∀ j 6= i : Yij > 0 and e0
j < e∗
j. Therefore, the equilibrium is
Pareto ineﬃcient.
2.3 Internal Anti-Sharing
Now we introduce internal Anti-Sharing as an alternative to the sharing con-
tract. Without loss of generality, we assign the role of the internal Anti-Sharer
to the nth team member. Each of the other (n − 1) agents promises to pay an
amount Pi ≥ 0 to the Anti-Sharer. Note that Pi is independent of the actual
eﬀort of player i. All players choose their eﬀort, denoted as ˆ ei. This generates
the actual output Y ( ˆ E), which is transferred to the Anti-Sharer. He then pays
out its value to each of the other team members, net of Pi.
A team faces a two stage game: during the ﬁrst stage, the players decide
whether to switch from a sharing contract to an Anti-Sharing contract, endowing
player n with this role, and in the second stage, they choose their eﬀort. Let us
ﬁrst derive the Nash equilibria in the second stage, provided that the n players
agree upon an internal Anti Sharing contract, i.e., the internal Anti-Sharing
subgame. We analyze player n and the other n−1 players separately and prove
the following
Proposition 1: If one team member oﬀers an Anti-Sharing contract to
each team member, then it is individually rational for the internal Anti-Sharer
to choose zero eﬀort.
Proof: Each one of the players i = 1..(n − 1) chooses his eﬀort ˆ ei so as to
maximize Y ( ˆ E(−i),ei)−ci(ei)−Pi. Thus, ˆ ei,i = 1..(n−1) satisfy the following
ﬁrst-order conditions for an internal solution: ∂Y ( ˆ E(−i),ei)/∂ei = dci/dei. This
would be equivalent to equation (1) above, the condition for a ﬁrst-best outcome,
provided that all players (including n) were doing the same. However, player
n still needs to be analyzed. He receives the lump sum payments from the
other players and the actual outcome, has to pay out n − 1 times the actual
outcome, and bears his own eﬀort costs. Thus, he chooses ˆ en to maximize Pn−1
i=1 Pi + Y ( ˆ E(−n),en) − (n − 1)Y ( ˆ E(−n),en) − cn(en). The ﬁrst derivative is
(2 − n)






n ≥ 2 implies that this expression is negative. Thus, the unique solution is
ˆ en = 0. 
The reason for this result is the distortion of the Anti-Sharer’s incentives to
spend eﬀort. On the one hand, he receives the actual output, but on the other
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his marginal net return from spending eﬀort is negative. The application of the
Anti-Sharing contract induces the internal Anti-Sharer to be unproductive in
equilibrium. Given ˆ en = 0, the team can only achieve second-best eﬃciency:
Proposition 2: It is one Nash equilibrium in the internal Anti-Sharing
subgame that the internal Anti-Sharer chooses ˆ en = 0 while the other (n − 1)
players choose second-best eﬃcient eﬀorts.
Proof: The second-best eﬃcient eﬀort maximizes Y (E−n,0) −
Pn−1
i=1 ci(ei).
Now, the ﬁrst-order conditions are







Expecting ˆ en = 0, each of the productive team members chooses his individual
eﬀort so as to maximize Y ( ˆ E(−i,−n),ei,0)−ci(ei)−Pi. The ﬁrst-order condition
is identical to expression (3). 
Now we include the ﬁrst stage of the game into the analysis. Two conditions
have to be met for an internal Anti-Sharing contract to become eﬀective: the
Anti-Sharer’s expected payoﬀ equals the expected payoﬀ of the productive team
members, and each of the n players has to be made better oﬀ than under a
sharing contract.
In the second-best eﬃcient equilibrium with homogeneous players,5 the Anti-
Sharer’s payoﬀ is (n−1)Pi−(n−2)Y ( ˆ E(−n),0). Each of the other players collects
Y ( ˆ E(−n),0) − ci(ˆ ei) − Pi. Setting the expected payoﬀs equal yields
Pi =
(n − 1)Y ( ˆ E(−n),0) − ci(ˆ ei)
n
.
This is the ﬁxed payment the n−1 productive players have to promise to the
Anti-Sharer. A diﬀerent Pi would implement Bertrand competition among the
team members for the position of the Anti-Sharer. The resulting expected payoﬀ
for all team members is [Y ( ˆ E(−n),0)−(n−1)ci(ˆ ei)]/n. Under a budget-balanced
sharing contract with equal shares, each team member expects Y (e0)/n−ci(e0
i).
All team members are, thus, better oﬀ if
Y ( ˆ E(−n),0) − (n − 1)ci(ˆ ei) > Y (e0) − n · ci(e0
i) (4)
Rearrangement of inequality (4) highlights that Anti-Sharing can make all
players better oﬀ if it induces an increase in output which exceeds n times
the diﬀerence in individual eﬀort costs, yet net of ci(ˆ ei), as the Anti-Sharer
abstains from productive activity under the internal Anti-Sharing contract. This
induces internal Anti-Sharing as an equilibrium which is subgame perfect, yet
not unique.
3 Discussion and conclusion
The above analysis has demonstrated that, for n homogeneous team members,
internal Anti-Sharing may provide a solution for the sharing problem of teams.
5The case of heterogenous team members is discussed in the ﬁnal section.
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If members are heterogeneous, then the role of the internal Anti-Sharer
should be assigned to the least productive player. However, the productiv-
ity of a player i consists of two components: his eﬀort directly increases the
output via his marginal productivity ((∂Y/∂ei), and it has an indirect impact
via the positive cross-partials (∂2Y/∂eiej∀j 6= i). Our model adds a third as-
pect of productivity: even if the Anti-Sharer does not directly contribute eﬀort,
the strategic impact of his presence may foster the team output.
External Anti-Sharing, e.g. the Anti-Insurer in Cooter/Porat (2002), can
be seen as a special case of internal Anti-Sharing with n heterogeneous team
members: a team of n − 1 productive members closes a contract with an nth
player who was unproductive in the ﬁrst place. If ∂Y/∂en = 0 and ∂2Y/∂eien =
0∀i = 1..n − 1, then the appearance of the external Anti-Sharer would even
implement a ﬁrst-best outcome, as there is no productivity loss. A ﬁrst-best
outcome can be implemented if the external Anti-Sharer collects zero payoﬀ
even though the mechanism is budget-balanced in the eﬃcient equilibrium.
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